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ABSTRACT
MACROPRUDENTIALS: SEPARATE FROM
MONETARY POLICY OR PART OF IT?
TOPALOG˘LU, Meltem
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Selin Sayek-Bo¨ke
September 2012
The structure of central bank in bank supervision is an important issue on
which there is not much focus whereas the independence of central banks
for the implementation of monetary policy is well investigated. Recently,
especially after the financial crisis, there is an increasing attention from pol-
icy makers and academicians about financial regulation and monetary policy
responsibility issue. Since the crisis turned to have severe macroeconomic
consequences, the financial supervision issue is taken into consideration to re-
vise. In this paper, first I briefly explain the policy objectives of both macro-
and microprudential regulations. Then, I use a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model which include separated and integrated responsibilities of
financial stability and monetary policy. As macroprudential policy tool, time
varying capital requirement ratio is used. Under a DSGE framework, it is
hard to see the separation of regulators, however the analyses is done in
terms of tools. The results imply that incorporating the central bank into
financial stability considerations can help smooth business cycle fluctuations,
and decreases the loss resulting from variances of main indicators.
Keywords: Macroprudential policy, monetary policy, DSGE model.
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O¨ZET
MAKROI˙HTI˙YATI˙ TEDBI˙RLER: PARA POLI˙TI˙KASI
I˙LE VEYA AYRI?
MELTEM TOPALOG˘LU
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
Eylu¨l 2012
Para politikasının uygulanması ac¸ısından merkez bankalarının bag˘ımsızlıg˘ı
u¨zerinde birc¸ok aras¸tırma yapılmıs¸ iken, dig˘er bir o¨nemli konu olan merkez
bankasının bankalar u¨zerindeki denetimsel yapısı u¨zerine c¸ok fazla yog˘unlas¸ıl-
mamıs¸tır. Son do¨nemlerde, o¨zellikle ku¨resel finansal krizi mu¨teakip, politika
belirleyiciler ve akademisyenler tarafından bu konuya artan bir ilgi mevcut-
tur. Krizin makroekonomik sonuc¸ları ciddi oldug˘u ic¸in, makro-ihtiyati ted-
birler yeniden go¨zden gec¸irilmek u¨zere dikkate alınmakta. Bu c¸alıs¸mada ilk
olarak mikro- ve makro-ihtiyati tedbirlerin amac¸ları kısaca ac¸ıklanacaktır.
Sonrasında, ayrı ve birles¸ik fiyat istikrarı ve finansal istikrar sorumluluk-
ları ic¸eren dinamik stokastik genel denge modeli kullanılacaktır. Dinamik
stokastik genel denge modeli c¸erc¸evesinde iki otoritenin ayrı veya birles¸ik
oldug˘unu saptamak c¸ok ac¸ık olmasa da politika arac¸ları u¨zerinden analiz
yapılmıs¸tır. Sonuc¸lar go¨stermektedir ki merkez bankası konjonktu¨r dalgalan-
malarını sakinles¸tirmek ve temel go¨stergelerin varyanslarından hesaplanan
refah kaybını azaltmak ic¸in finansal istikrarı dikkate almalıdır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Makro-ihtiyati politika, para politikası, Dinamik stokastik
genel denge modeli
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The structure of central bank in bank supervision is an important issue
on which there is not much focus whereas the independence of central banks
for the implementation of monetary policy is well investigated. Recently,
especially after the financial crisis, there is an increasing attention from pol-
icy makers and academicians about financial regulation and monetary policy
responsibility issue. There are many elements of this debate. First one is
whether bank supervisory duties affect the performance of monetary policy
of central bank or not. In other words, whether the combination of mon-
etary policy responsibility and supervisory responsibilities leads to conflicts
of interest or not. This leads to the main debate of bank supervision and
monetary policy responsibilities’ separation or integration issue. The finan-
cial crisis highlighted another issue related to supervision responsibilities due
to financial instabilities and imbalances. Since the crisis turned to have se-
vere macroeconomic consequences, the financial supervision issue is taken into
consideration to revise.
The consensus on this issue is that macroprudential regulations should be
strengthened instead of giving much attention to microprudential regulations
due to the results faced with the financial crisis for the whole system. In
this paper, first I will briefly explain the policy objectives of both macro- and
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microprudential regulations. Then, I will use a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model which include separated and integrated responsibilities of
financial stability and monetary policy. Under different implementation of
the two policies, there are experiments conducted. The results state that the
welfare implications differs and minimizes when the two regulatory bodies
exist and the central bank takes the financial stability into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief literature review including the policy objectives of macro- and micropru-
dential regulations, and the motivation of my research. Section 3 provides a
brief description of distinct models, and of the model of my study; then, iden-
tifies alternative tools and policy experiments, and states the results. Section
4 concludes.
2
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
MOTIVATION
2.1 Literature Review
Firstly, the separation of monetary policy responsibility and supervisory
responsibility issue will be reviewed. In the literature, there are opponents
and proponents of separation of monetary policy responsibilities and super-
visory responsibilities. The argument consists that for either combination,
the central bank’s supervisory duties affect monetary policy and vice versa.
Proponents argue that the combination leads to conflict of interest between
the monetary authority seeking higher interest rates and the supervisory au-
thority concerned with profitability of banking sector and the adverse effect of
interest rate on the solvency. On the other hand, opponents argue that these
two responsibilities of central bank are linked to the central bank’s aim of
systematic stability of financial system and to the protection of the payments
system. The argument especially considers the central bank’s lender-of-last-
resort facilities, and for these facilities, there arises moral hazard issue.
To begin with the arguments for separation in the literature, Goodhart
and Schoenmaker (1992) made a general point that states the cyclical behav-
ior of macro (monetary) and micro (regulatory) policy tend to be in conflict.
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The effects of regulation and supervision tend to be procyclical, whereas
monetary policy is generally countercyclical. During the periods of economic
slowdown, the financial conditions of banks usually deteriorate, but the su-
pervisory requirements make banks to tighten credits during recessions. For
that reason, the central bank is expected to be less strict in supervision to
complement monetary policy. Because of the conflicts, the key point is the
institutional setup. Some researchers argue that internalizing conflicts within
a single agency may be an efficient solution. (Briault, 1999; Llewellyn, 1999)
Heller (1991) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992) compared the inflation
who have central banks with and without supervisory responsibilities to see
whether conflicting goals affect the central banks’ supervisory responsibili-
ties. Their findings state that the countries whose central banks without
supervisory responsibilities achieved lower inflation rates on average.
On the other hand, for the opposition to the separation of responsibilities,
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) begin the separation issue by examining
which regime is more efficient in decreasing banking failures, and at the same
time, trying to avoid from systematic consequences. Particularly, they an-
alyzed the methods for handling bank failures and the resources of funding
under each regime is the same or not. Furthermore, they investigate whether
bank rescues are financed on an implicit bank/commercial bank basis, or on an
explicit deposit insurance/government basis. They conduct a cross-country
survey of how some 104 major bank failures were handled. They claim that
central banks are changing their behavior and retreat their primary role which
is price stability due to two reasons: firstly, since banking system becomes
less clearly defined, it is more difficult to persuade the members of the bank-
ing club to cooperate financial rescues; secondly, the central bank is able to
organize cooperation on a self-regulatory basis. They argue that because of
structural developments, supervisory function shifts to an independent body
that is more directly under political control. They found that countries where
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these two responsibilities are not separated, there are fewer bank failures on
average.
Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) examines whether supervisory respon-
sibilities improve the efficiency of monetary policy implementation. They
claim two reasons to expect supervisory information improve economic fore-
cast accuracy and the efficiency of monetary policy. Firstly, problems in bank-
ing sector may be a signal of worsening macroeconomic conditions. Secondly,
the information may help to notice changes in lending behavior of banks.
Their study concerns whether internal forecasts of the Fed incorporate con-
fidential bank supervisory information, whether this supervisory information
affects monetary policy and, lastly, whether the Fed should involve in supervi-
sory role directly through a model. They found that supervisory information
affects monetary policy, as banking sector worsens, the probability of tight-
ening monetary policy decreases. The evidence shows that the conduct of
monetary policy requires full access to supervisory information. This interac-
tion may become more important in developing countries because of the fact
that their credit markets are usually bank-centered. They claim that due to
the problems in banking sector, many countries are contemplating separation
of supervision responsibilities from central bank.
Similarly, Iaoannidou (2005) examines whether monetary policy duties
affect the central bank’s supervision. If it is the case, how the channel of
the effect is, and the analysis is conducted by using the segmented struc-
ture of the US bank regulatory and supervisory system. The study uses the
Federal Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), who have also supervisory responsibilities with the Fed, as
control groups, and compare the supervisory behavior of the Fed with these
two agencies. The paper’s analysis is focused on a particular aspect of bank
supervision which is the imposition of formal regulatory actions. According
to the estimation results, the Fed’s monetary policy duties alter its bank
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supervisory responsibility. He mentions that causality is one way from mon-
etary policy to supervision. By sensitivity analysis, this paper also examines
whether any business cycle indicators affect bank supervision and the result
states that indicators of business cycle matter for all the three agents. More-
over, by another robustness check, it is seen that the Fed’s behavior cannot
be attributed to monetary policy having a greater impact on the particular
banks that it supervises.
Masciandro, Quintyn and Taylor (2008) analyze recent trends and deter-
minants of financial supervisory governance. First, they compute the inde-
pendence and accountability ratings of supervisions for 55 countries in which
there are 27 countries that have integrated responsibilities, and 28 coun-
tries that have separated responsibilities. By using the degree of supervisory
governance as dependent variable, they run three regressions, which take de-
pendent variables as total governance, independence and accountability of
supervision. In the regressions, they have an independent variable as central
bank effect to control for the impact of the policymaker’s decision to have
the supervisor inside the central bank. For one regression equation, it tests
for the impact of the central bank as supervisor. Another independent vari-
able is integrated supervisor, which concerns the degree of integration of the
supervisor-the choice between sector-specific supervisors on one extreme and
fully unified supervisors. For another regression equation, it tests the impact
of the degree of concentration of supervisory activities.
Their results state that the presence of supervisors in the central bank
has a significant and negative impact on governance behaviors, but, more
integrated supervisors outside the central bank increase the probability of
higher governance ratings. Furthermore, the results for the overall ratings
state that neither the role of the central bank as a supervisor nor the degree
of unification outside the central bank seems to have an impact on the degree
of independence; and, the presence of the central bank has a negative effect
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on accountability of supervision, but, if the supervisors located outside the
central bank are more unified, accountability of supervision increases.
A recent study is conducted by Eichengreen and Dincer (2011). It is stated
that transfer of supervisory authority to a governmental agency separate from
the central bank raised the issue of accountability and independence. On the
other hand, during the crisis, the central bank’s role is to provide emergent
liquidity to the banking system, and as being a lender of last resort, the
central bank must be involved in supervision of financial system. But, to
fulfill the duty to provide emergent liquidity, the central bank should have
up-to-date information. To analyze both sides and make a systematic analysis
for cross section of countries, they pooled the data according to the structure
of bank supervision and used 140 countries from 1998 to 2010. They find that
supervisory responsibilities tend to be assigned to the central bank in low-
income countries. They also showed that this choice of separation makes a
difference in outcomes. For example, countries with independent supervisors
have less nonperforming loans as a share of GDP even after controlling for
inflation, per capita income and country/year fixed effects. Furthermore,
they claim that supervision is often assigned to an independent agency where
accountability of government is high.
In addition to separation of supervisory responsibility and monetary pol-
icy, the issue of how financial stabilization is conducted is also become impor-
tant especially after the financial crisis. Regulatory framework was claimed
as deficient because of its microprudential structure. The safeguards against
financial instability should be strengthened, and the debate is about the chan-
nel of the defense. The recent consensus is a move from microprudentials to
macroprudentials. According to Ben Bernanke (2008):
“Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what
their appropriate ’field of vision’ should be. Under our current system of
safety-and-soundness regulation, supervisors often focus on the financial con-
ditions of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which
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has been called system wide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the
mandate of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of poten-
tial systemic risks and weaknesses as well.”
In the literature, it is claimed that by both supervisory agency and the
central bank, important aspects of macroeconomy have been overlooked. The
argument about financial system is that systemic risk has not been taken into
account as it should be. The regulations conducted for financial stability was
microprudentials in which the policy is limited to distress of individual insti-
tutions. The ultimate objective of microprudential regulation is consumer (in-
vestor/depositor) protection. The risk is taken as exogenous, and correlations
and common exposures across institutions are considered to be irrelevant. As
a result, the calibration of prudential controls is bottom-up. The idea is that
while the banks financing themselves with government-insured deposits and
deposit insurance has the effect of preventing runs (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983; Bryant, 1980), it creates an incentive for managers of banks to take ex-
cessive risks. The aim of capital regulation is to make banks internalize losses
to protect the deposit insurance fund and to eliminate moral hazard. If the
level of the probability of the deposit insurer bearing losses is low enough, the
microprudential regulation is working. However, there is a critique that when
a microprudentially-oriented regulator pushes a troubled bank to restore its
capital ratio, the regulator does not care through which channel it is done,
either raising new capital or by shrinking assets. If bank chooses to shrink its
assets, and if the large fraction of the system is in trouble, similar attempts
of many institutions can be damaging for the whole economy. (Borio, 2003)
Before the global financial crisis, systemic risk was insufficiently under-
stood and its importance was underestimated. Its influence on the real econ-
omy was also ignored. That is why the emphasis is moving from macro-
prudential regulation to micro-prudential regulation which failed to ensure
that financial institutions had sufficient capital and liquidity to cope with the
financial and real sector shocks. The design of the macro-prudential policy is
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under attention. The agreement is that the purpose should be to reduce the
systemic risk, strengthening the financial system against shocks and to pro-
vide stable functioning. However, the questions and debate continues since
there is not a consensus exists yet. Firstly, the point is to define the systemic
risk. A proposed definition made by the IMF, FSB and BIS is as the follow-
ing: a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment
of all parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious neg-
ative consequences for the real economy. Macroprudential policy focuses on
the financial market as system-wide. For that reason, it complements the
focus of the microprudential policy that is the risk of individual institutions
and takes economy as given. It has two main objectives: to strengthen the
financial systems resilience to economic downturns, and to limit the build-up
of financial risks to reduce the probability and the severity of a bust.
Central banks have the responsibility of financial stability, sometimes im-
plicitly. Macroeconomic stability reduces the financial system vulnerability,
and a strong financial system reinforces the monetary policy. In fact, they
both need to take into account each others developments and objectives. The
significance of each of them on the other depends on the financial conditions,
macroeconomic environment and the share of bank-based intermediation. By
the coordination of the two authorities, it is expected to gather more moder-
ate cycles. Before the global crisis, the consensus is that the monetary policy
should focus on inflation targeting. However, there is an increasing literature
that searches the implementation of macroprudential policy while the central
bank implements the price stability. The stabilization of the macroeconomic
environment requires a successful monetary and macro-prudential policy that
the two reinforce each other. The point is to clearly define and differentiate
the two objectives not to have conflicts. To implement the two objectives,
design of the instrument gains importance. The prudential standards such
as high capital requirement and liquidity buffers should be adjusted dynami-
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cally to correspond the changing financial environment. Adjustments should
be done during boom time when the vulnerabilities are built, and in bust
time, when risks of a destabilizing credit contraction are rising. The interac-
tion between financial system and the macroeconomy remains incomplete in
the literature. As a result, the exact definition of the systemic risk, the role
of macroprudential policy effecting the behavior and interaction also remain
imcomplete. Due to changes in banking activities and the structure of the
financial system, the transmission mechanism seems to change over time.
In contrast to microprudential regulation, macroprudential regulation takes
into account of the financial system as a whole. The proximate objective is
to limit financial system wide risk, which is systemic risk, and it is considered
as endogenous; for that reason, correlations and common exposures across
institutions are important. The ultimate objective is to avoid output (GDP)
costs. (Borio, 2003) The macroprudential regulation can be characterized as
an effort to control the social costs associated with excessive balance sheet
shrinkage in the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common
shock. By macroprudential regulation, the aim is to increase the degree of
capitalization of financial intermediaries and reduce the pro-cyclicality of the
financial system induced by risk-based capital rules. Since asset shrinkage has
primary costs of credit-crunch and fire-sale effects, the macroprudential reg-
ulation should counterbalance the two incentives: first, instead of shrinking
asset, choosing to recapitalize once a crisis is underway; and secondly, before
a crisis occurs, operating with too-thin capital buffers. (Hanson, Kashyap,
Stein, 2010)
While the macroprudential tools are discussed, there is a growing recent
literature on the countercyclical behaviour of capital requirements which is
one type of macroprudential tool. Christensen et al. (2011) analyze a study
to conduct the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for
stabilization of financial an economic cycles, and examines its interaction
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with monetary policy. They use bank-capital regulation as macropruden-
tial regulation. They find that countercyclical bank leverage regulation can
have desirable stabilization properties, especially when financial shocks are
in an important source of fluctuations, but, the appropriate contribution of
countercyclical capital requirements to stabilization after a technology shock
depends on the size of the externality and on the conduct of monetary policy.
Furthermore, they find that strong interactions between monetary policy and
bank regulation policy may exist. They claim that the stabilization bene-
fits of countercyclical capital requirements for a standard productivity shock
depend on the policy response taken by the monetary authority.
Another study emphasizing the role of macroprudential regulation is of
Aikman et al. (2010). They state that drawing on the evidence, some new
policy may be needed which (unlike monetary policy) targets bank balance
sheets directly but which (unlike microprudential policy) does so systemati-
cally. This is macroprudential policy. One important implication of this study
is that coordination problem among individual institutions suggests system-
atic, across the system actions to smooth credit booms and busts. The tools
to be used in smoothing can be procyclical capital, liquidity requirements,
and remuneration packages.
Glocker and Towbin (2011) build a small open economy model with nomi-
nal rigidities, financial fractions and a banking sector that is subject to reserve
requirements. They state that if the central bank’s responsibility is only price
stability and uses the interest rate as its main policy instrument, varying re-
serve requirements has little effect on economic stability in that case. They
find that in an economy without financial frictions and where the central bank
pursues a price stability mandate the gains are not as important, but in an
economy where financial frictions are present, the central bank has a financial
stability objective.
In my research I will consider basically integration and separation of fi-
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nancial supervision and monetary policy responsibilities, in which financial
regulation is conducted through the channels of macroprudential regulation.
Recently, this issue is still debated. Ben Bernanke (2011) states that:
“In practice, the distinction between macroeconomic and financial stabil-
ity objectives will always be blurred to some extent, given the powerful inter-
actions between financial and economic conditions. For example, monetary
policy actions that improve the economic outlook also tend to improve the
conditions of financial firms; likewise, actions to support the normal function-
ing of financial institutions and markets can help achieve the central bank’s
monetary policy objectives by improving credit flows and enhancing monetary
policy transmission. Still, the debate about whether it is possible to dedicate
specific policy tools to the macroeconomic and financial stability objectives
is a useful one that raises some important practical questions. A leading
example is the question of whether monetary policy should ’lean against’
movements in asset prices or credit aggregates in an effort to promote finan-
cial stability. In my view, the issue is not whether central bankers should
ignore possible financial imbalances–they should not–but, rather, what ’the
right tool for the job’ is to respond to such imbalances.
The evolving consensus, which is by no means settled, is that monetary
policy is too blunt a tool to be routinely used to address possible financial im-
balances; instead, monetary policy should remain focused on macroeconomic
objectives, while more- targeted microprudential and macroprudential tools
should be used to address developing risks to financial stability, such as exces-
sive credit growth.. The diverse tools of financial regulation and supervision,
together with appropriate monitoring of the financial system, should be, I
believe, the first line of defense against the threat of financial instability.”
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2.2 New arrangements in UK and USA
Recently, Europe, the US and the UK adopted new institutional arrange-
ments in regard to macro-prudential policy.1 In the US, the Financial Reg-
ulation Bill was approved and created a new Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) which is independent from the Fed and headed by the Trea-
sury Secretary (in July 2010). It is claimed to be the most extensive financial
service regulation since the Great Depression. The Financial Regulation Bill
creates the FSOC, and also, there are other regulations it establishes: a new
system for the liquidation of certain financial companies; regulation of deriva-
tives, credit rating agencies and securitization; corporate governance require-
ments. The FSOC has the duty of monitoring the systemic risks posed by
large and complex financial firms, of monitoring international and domestic
regulatory proposals, of making recommendation to regulators and the Fed
on macro-prudential standards. Furthermore, to use in analysis, it request
data from the Office of Financial Research (OFR). In the regulation process,
qualified data flow to the policy makers is important and the OFR has the
task of it, and provides support to the FSOC in that manner. Although
the FSOC is independent from the Fed, the Fed is charged with establishing
prudential standards autonomously or at the FSOCs recommendations. In
the same period, in the UK, a new Financial Policy Committee within the
Bank of England was created with a proposal to maintain financial stability.
Since the UK noticed failure of the tripartite regulator system, with the new
arrangement, the aim is to have a single authority that holds the responsibil-
ity of micro- and macro-prudential policy in its hands, and it is the central
bank. The new Financial Stability Committee is created within the Bank of
England and independent from the Monetary Policy Committee. However, it
ensures that hereafter the monetary policy is aware of the macro-prudential
policy. The coordination problem is solved due to the fact that the commit-
1Beau, Clerc, Mojon, 2011
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tee chair is the Governor of the ECB. The importance of coordination plays
a crucial role in the information flow process to consider the two objectives
of monetary and macro-prudential policy. Furthermore, the database of the
central bank to conduct the monetary policy provides a convenience to imple-
ment the macro-prudential policy. The main difference between the US and
the UK is the lack of autonomous regulatory tools. In Europe, the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was created by the European Commission in-
dependent from the European Central Bank. The FSOC has full authority to
control macro-prudential tools, however the ESRB is not provided with full
authority, it had the task to provide recommendations, after January 2011, it
has the task of identifying and measuring the systemic risk. The Eurosystem
and the ECB provides technical, analytical and administrative support to the
ESRB. The governors of all EU central banks are present in the Board of the
ESRB, and the president of the ECB is the chair of the ESRB, that shows
the crucial role of the ECB in the new regulatory framework. It creates an
ease of coordination and flow of information between authorities.
2.3 Motivation
The motivation of my research originates in the results of the financial crisis
that Turkey experienced in 2001 and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.
After the crisis of 2001, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)
was founded. Proceeding the global crisis experienced at 2008-2009, many
academicians and/or politicians claimed that since there is a banking regula-
tory system, and our financial system was strengthened, the global crisis did
not affect our financial system, however, the real indicators of economy was
affected. This claim is the starting point of my thesis. Recently, there is an
increasing debate that BRSA has not been using its macroprudential tools,
for that reason monetary policy is not as efficient as it is expected to be.
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My contribution to the existing literature will be in the framework of
the separation issue to see the discrepancies of the two different structures
of regulatory bodies. With a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model,
in a simple setup of banking sector, my aim is to capture the interaction of
macroprudential policy with monetary policy. In line with my motivation, the
interest of my study is how the effect of a macroprudential regulation on the
real indicators of the economy, especially output, in case of a real shock such
as productivity shock, is. Moreover, my extension will be the comparison of
the cases for different mix of the macroprudential tool and monetary policy
tool, and the analysis of an integrated one policy maker.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL
3.1 Benchmark Models in the Literature
In this section, first, I will briefly introduce four distinct models, then
introduce my study’s model. First model will be of Angelini et al. (2010).,
the second one is of Gerali et al. (2010) which is a benchmark model for
Angelini et al.’s study, the third one is of Unsal (2011), and the fourth one
is of Aydin and Volkan (2011). As a benchmark model to my paper, I will
use Aydin and Volkan’s model with some modifications that is appropriate
for this research and for the aim of the research. The details of the changes
will be given in the preceding part. For the other models, the reason why the
part of the model is used, not used or modified will be explained. In fact, I
will use the logic of all the models when constructing my model or modifying
the benchmark model.
Firstly, the study of Angelini et al. (2010) is described as following.1
They use a dynamic general equilibrium model of the euro area to answer
three main questions: 1. Within a standard macroeconomic framework, how
should macroprudential objectives be modelled? 2. How should macropru-
dential tools/rules be designed? 3. What would be the interaction between
1Since the model of Gerali et al.(2010) is a benchmark model for Angelini et al. (2010),
the two will not be introduced separately
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macroprudential policy and monetary policy? They build on a DSGE model
developed by Gerali et al. (2010) that features a banking sector with cap-
ital to capture the basic elements of banks’ balance sheets. In the model,
the economy is populated by entrepreneurs, households and banks. House-
holds consume, work and accumulate housing wealth. There exist two types of
households that differ in degree of impatience (discount factor), this gives rise
to borrowing and lending in equilibrium. Entrepreneurs produce consump-
tion and investment goods using capital and labor supplied by households.
There are two types of one-period financial instruments supplied by banks:
saving assets and loans. Borrowers face a collateral constraint which is tied
to the value of collateral holdings. Banks set interest rates on deposits and
loans to maximize profits, and they face a quadratic cost of deviating from
an optimal capital to assets ratio. Different from Gerali et al. (2010) model,
they introduce heterogeneity in the creditworthiness of the various economic
operators in a reduced form ad hoc way, and risk-sensitive capital require-
ments, use time varying capital requirements which is fixed at its steady state
value in benchmark model. Furthermore, they introduce the objective (loss)
functions of the two authorities while introducing the two macroprudential
tools.
As macroprudential policy, they use two tools: the first one is counter-
cyclical capital requirements, and the second one is loan-to-value ratio. The
macroprudential regulator is interested in stabilizing the loans/GDP ratio
and GDP around steady state. Their first exercise is that for given monetary
policy, the macroprudential policymaker chooses the parameters of the capi-
tal requirement function to minimize the loss function of the macroprudential
policymaker. They compare the values of the objective function under a tech-
nology shock and a credit crunch shock for both macroprudential policies sep-
arately. Instead of comparing the loss function, they check for volatilities of
output and the ratio of loans to output, and state that an active management
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of capital requirements is more effective than managing the loan-to-value ra-
tio under both types of shocks. However, the loan-to-value policy is relatively
more effective in the stabilization of the loans to output ratio, which leads
to the conclusion that there is a trade off between stabilization of economic
activity and financial stability. It is seen that the variance of inflation and
policy rate increase regardless of which type of macroprudential tool is used.
This suggests that there might be a conflict between monetary policy and
macroprudential policy.
The second exercise is a game setup to see the interaction between mon-
etary policy and macroprudential policy. Firstly, they assume that only one
policy maker that have monetary policy and macroprudential policy responsi-
bility, and have the objective of stabilizing the variances of inflation, output,
the loans to output ratio, and of the changes in the instruments. In this
case, the equilibrium is a cooperative one since there is one authority im-
plementing the two policies. In the game setup, secondly, they assume that
the monetary policymaker and the macroprudential policymaker interact a la
Nash. Each authority minimizes its own loss function and takes the others
policy as given. There are three equilibria found, cooperative and two Nash.
There is no significant change in the volatilities of the key macroeconomic
variables. However, the variability of the policy rate increases between 14
and 18 times depending on the type of Nash equilibrium, but the variability
of the capital requirement can either increase or decrease relative to the co-
operative equilibrium. This result suggests that there is a conflict between
the two instruments.
To sum their conclusions: the results suggest that macroprudential poli-
cies have the power to stabilize the dynamics of the economy. When there is
a technology shock, the best result is gathered by the link of capital require-
ments and output growth through macroprudential policy. In all cases that
were analyzed, macroprudential policy attains a reduction in the variability
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of output, loans to output ratio and the cost of inflation variability.
In the cooperative equilibrium, the macroprudential policy acts as coun-
tercyclical, and results in a modest effect. If they let two authorities to op-
timize their own objective function independently, two Nash equilibria arise.
In the first one, the monetary policy authority is better than macroprudential
authority and in the second one the opposite case holds. The Nash equilibria
suggest that there is substantial coordination problems that bring suboptimal
results.
This model is helpful to identify the functional form of macroprudential
policy. However, in the benchmark model of Gerali et al.(2010) Bayesian
estimation method is used, and since the agents of the model is detailed
beyond the necessity, due to time constraint, I will use the functional form of
macroprudential policies and the loss function of two authorities.
The study of Unsal (2011) analyzes the interplay between monetary policy
and macroprudential regulations in an open economy DSGE model framework
under nominal and real frictions. In this study, a two country sticky price
DSGE model is developed with a full specification of trade and financial link-
ages between two countries. Three important modifications are made: macro-
prudential measures are introduced into the monetary policy, entrepreneurs
are allowed to borrow from domestic and foreign resources, and capital inflows
are modelled as a favorable change in the perception of lenders.
The representative household seeks to maximize expected life-time utility
subject to the budget constraint. There are three types of firms in the model:
production firms, importing firms and competitive firms. Production firms
produce a differentiated final consumption good using capital and labor as
inputs. Final goods’ prices are sticky in terms of the local currency of the
markets where they are sold. Importing firms have some market power and
face adjustment costs in changing prices. The law of one price does not hold
due to price stickiness. Competitive firms combine investment and rented
19
capital to produce unfinished capital goods that are sold to entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs produce capital that is rented to production firms and finance
investment in capital through internal funds and external borrowing.
There exists a continuum of perfectly competitive financial intermediaries
that collect deposits from households and loan the money to entrepreneurs
in every period, and receive capital inflows from the rest of the world in the
form of foreign loans to domestic entrepreneurs. According to the zero profit
condition, the lending rates are equal to the expected value of interest rate
times external risk premium on foreign and domestic borrowing. For the
introduction of macroprudential policy, the lending rates equation is used. It
is claimed that for either type of macroprudential policy tool entails additional
costs for financial intermediaries. When macroprudential policy is introduced
to the model, the spread between lending rate and policy rate is affected by
the risk premium and regulation premium which is defined as a function of
the aggregate nominal credit growth.
In the study, the performance of policies are compared under financial
and technology shock cases for the following scenarios: Taylor rule, Taylor
rule with macroprudential policy, macroprudential policy without monetary
policy, optimized Taylor rule with macroprudential policy and Taylor rule
with capital controls.
The results of this study suggest that macroprudential policy on capital
controls is less effective than broader tools to decrease the effect of the shocks.
Also, macroprudential policy tools are not a substitute for a tighter monetary
policy and cannot provide the stability of the economy. Furthermore, it is
stated that the use of macroprudential policy is supported under large capital
inflows which are resulted from a positive shock to investors’ perception.
Another study is conducted by Aydin and Volkan (2011). They use small
open economy DSGE model, and calibrate it for Korea for the period 2003-
2007, with real and financial frictions. This model is based on Bernanke et
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al. (1998). The frictions in the model are price stickiness, investment de-
lays, and financial frictions. Financial frictions are captured by explicitly
incorporating a housing sector and entrepreneurs, and modelled using finan-
cial accelerator framework to capture the amplifying effect of financial shocks
on macroeconomy. The economy consists of consumers, homeowners, con-
struction companies, entrepreneurs/wholesale producers, capital producers,
retailers, banks as the financial sector, the government and the external sec-
tor. Consumers are infinitely-lived risk-averse agents. They work, consume,
and save. They save in the form of bank deposits which pay a risk-free in-
terest rate. Homeowners own the entire housing stock. The rental payment
received from consumers is their main source of income. They finance their
housing investment through a down payment and a one period mortgage loan
extended by the bank. Construction companies repair old houses and build
new housing stock. Entrepreneurs/wholesale producers manage the produc-
tion of wholesale goods. Entrepreneurs demand labor simultaneously while
their demand for capital is decided one period ahead. Capital producers use
the existing capital to produce investment goods. Retailers are monopolis-
tically competitive firms owned by consumers. Banks extend corporate and
mortgage loans to the nonfinancial sector by relying on their net worth, con-
sumer deposits, and borrowings from international financial markets. The
external sector consists of the economy’s trade and the rest of the world.
On the government side, government follow the fiscal rule for a balanced
budget, and the monetary policy applies an inflation targeting framework.
To compare the benchmark interest rule to alternative inflation targeting
rule with financial stability (ITFS), they consider four alternative ITFS rules.
First one incorporates nonfinancial sector risk premium into monetary rule.
The second one incorporates financial sector risk premium into monetary
policy rule. The third alternative rule, they use credit volume under two
financial stability considerations: the central bank ensures financial stability
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by (i) encouraging credit to nonfinancial private sector, (ii) by discouraging
credit. As the fourth rule, they incorporate the volatility in the house prices
to the benchmark inflation targeting rule. The simulations they conducted
show that a central bank can conduct policy better by incorporating financial
stability into its inflation targeting framework, especially if the distortions is
form the supply side. This paper incorporates alternative financial stability
rules into the inflation targeting framework. In my analysis, it will be guiding
for the construction of monetary policy rule when monetary policy authority
and financial stability authority is not separated. Since the model much more
incorporated into housing sector and analyzes the supply side, I will not use
this model as the benchmark model for my research, but update it according
to my analysis.
The Benchmark Model
To understand the new strand of policy, the measures of systemic risk and
financial instability, and also the policy tools should be defined accurately.
From the literature review, it is obvious that the macroprudential policies
are important as monetary policy tool contemporaneously. The current con-
sensus highlights the following considerations: policies aim reducing the pro-
cyclicality of the financial system are in potential conflict with other policies
which also aim smoothing business cycle fluctuations, the closer link between
monetary policy and macroprudential regulation increases the transmission of
monetary policy target; and, the stated proposals pursue the two objectives
of macroprudential regulation without differentiating the two.
In my research my aim is to see the effects of separated or integrated
supervision, and monetary policy responsibilities on the social welfare. Fol-
lowing the recent consensus, I assume financial regulation is macropruden-
tial. Firstly, by using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, I
will address to the following questions: (i) how should the macroprudential
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framework be modelled within a standard framework? (ii) How would be
the interaction of monetary policy and macroprudential regulation? In other
words, should these two responsibilities separated, in which they cooperate,
or integrated for the welfare of the society?
My contribution will be to answer to the problem of coordination of two
authorities, and to control and compare for different cases of two regulatory
bodies for the macroprudential tool of time-varying capital requirements.
In my research, I will model macroprudential policy tool as Angelini et al.
(2010) study and use their definition for the loss functions for each regulatory
body. As a subcase (future work) for integrated two regulatory bodies, I will
use the general formulation of loss function given as:
L = αLcb + (1− α)Lmp
in which α denotes the relative weight of the central bank, and (1−α) is of
the macroprudential regulator. If is allowed to vary between zero and one,
it gives the chance to see its impact on the total loss function. I will analyze
for the separated cases in which there also exist a communicative behaviour
between two policy makers. The overall loss function that will be used will
help to see the overall loss to the society for given different levels of powers
of policy makers, for different cases results from different tools implemented
by macroprudential regulator.
The model is solved numerically using MATLAB, log linearization is made,
the first order approximation and stochastic simulations is gathered using
Dynare.
For future work, the model will be simulated for the data of Turkey.
Since Turkey is a good example economy to check for the effectiveness of
macroprudential policy tools since it has foreign borrowing, and capital flows,
it is obvious that the macroprudential regulation is substantially important
for the control of the systemic risk. I expect to see a difference in the welfare
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loss when the two responsibilities are separated or integrated. The results
will also depend on which macroprudential tool is used.
Curdia and Woodford (2009) states that in a simple new Keynesian model
with-time varying credit due to financial frictions the optimal target criterion
is the same as in the basic New Keynesian model, for that reason, the cen-
tral bank loss function is defined accurately to capture the stabilization of
inflation and output gap. Welfare loss for both policy authorities are defined
as the sum of the variables’ volatilities from their steady state values. In
the standard loss function of the monetary policy authority, there is no men-
tion of macroprudential tool. However, if we regard the two authorities are
integrated, the loss function will change as including financial instability.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Households
Households are infinitely-lived risk averse agents. They work, consume and
save. They work for the wholesale goods producers for a wage income, and
decide how much of the disposable income to consume and save. They con-
sume tradable goods from domestic and foreign wholesale producers. They
save in the form of bank deposits that pay a risk-free interest rate.
Households maximize the life-time utility function:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(Ct − hCt−1)− 1
1 + χ
L1+χc,t
]}
(3.1)
with discount factor 0 < β < 1, χ > 0 inverse of the Frisch labor supply
elasticity. At time t, consumers supply labor services Lc,t at the real wage
Wc,t, consume a composite consumption good Ct, pay lump-sum real taxes
Tt to the government, and receive real dividends from banks Πb,t, save Dt+1
as real deposits in banks in return of risk-free interest rate. The budget
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constraint of households is given by:
Ct +
θd
2
(
D¯ −Dt+1
)2
= Wc,tLc,t − Tt + Πb,t +Rt−1Dt −Dt+1 (3.2)
Ct is the composite of the tradable consumption goods, the CES index defines
household preferences over domestic consumption, Cd,t, and foreign consump-
tion Cf,t:
Ct =
[
(γ)
1
ρ (Cd,t)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− γ) 1ρ (Cf,t)
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(3.3)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between domes-
tic and foreign final goods, γ is the share of domestic final good in composite
consumption good. Cd,t is a composite of differentiated products sold by do-
mestically competitive retailers. The corresponding Consumer Price Index
(CPI) equation is given by:
Pt =
[
(γ)(Pd,t)
1−ρ + (1− γ)(Pf,t)1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ (3.4)
The demand for domestic relative to foreign final goods by consumers is given
as:
Cd,t
Cf,t
=
γ
1− γ
(
Pd,t
Pf,t
)−ρ
(3.5)
The household’s objective is to maximize their life-time utility subject to
the budget constraint. Optimal consumption allocation, labor supply and
consumption/saving decision is found as:
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 (3.6)
λt = βλt+1Rt(1− θd(Dt+1 − D¯))−1 (3.7)
Lc,t = (λtWc,t)
1
χ (3.8)
where λt is the marginal utility of the consumption index.
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3.2.2 Real Sector
Entrepreneurs and Wholesale Producers
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral agents who make the production in the econ-
omy. They manage wholesale goods production with a finite expected life
horizon of 1/(1−φe), φe is the probability that each entrepreneur will survive
until next period. The entrepreneurs’ population is stationary. To ensure
that new entrepreneurs have some funds available when starting out, each
entrepreneur is endowed with Le,t units of labor. The entrepreneur starts any
period with capital Kt Using labor Lt, which is given as Lt = L
(Ω)
e,t L
(1−Ω)
c,t and
capital services utKt, where ut is the capital utilization rate entrepreneurs
produce domestic wholesale output Yw,t :
Yw,t = ωtAt(utKt)
αL1−αt (3.9)
The common productivity shock, At, follows an AR(1) process which is com-
mon to all entrepreneurs:
At = A
ρa
t−1exp(a,t) (3.10)
The idiosyncratic shock, ωt is assumed to be an i.i.d random variable with
Et {ωt} = 1, and it affects the effective quantity of capital in production of
wholesale goods and the production of new goods. In other words, it may
be considered as a measure of the quality of his overall capital investment.
Let Pw,t be the real price of wholesale output, PI,t the replacement price of
capital, Qt the real market price of capital. The entrepreneur’s gross project
output, GPYw,t, is equal to the sum of output revenues, and the market value
of the capital stock, net of the cost of repairing the depreciated capital, by
definition.
GPYw,t = Pw,tYt + (Qt − PI,tδt)ωtKt (3.11)
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The capital depreciation rate is increasing in ut where utilization is endoge-
nized following Greenwod, Hercowitz and Huffman. Depreciation is increasing
in utilization rate and a convex function of it, and defined by1:
δt = δ +
b
1 + ξ
(ut)
1+ξ (3.12)
where δ, b, ξ > 0. Entrepreneurs’ decision problem is to choose labor, capital
and capital utilization rate conditional on At, ωt and Kt maximizing the profit
as:
max
ut,Lt
[Pw,tYw,t + (Qt − PI,tδt)ωtKt −WtLt] (3.13)
The optimal choice of labor, capital and capital utilization rate is:
(1− α)(1− Ω)Yw,t
Lc,t
=
Wc,t
Pw,t
(3.14)
(1− α)ΩYw,t
Le,t
=
We,t
Pw,t
(3.15)
α
Yw,t
ut
= ωtδ
′
tKt
PI,t
Pw,t
(3.16)
α
Yw,t
Kt+1
Pw,t + (Qt+1 − PI,t+1δt)ωt+1 = Rb,t+1Qt (3.17)
where the optimal capital utilization rate equation states that the marginal
value of the output gain from a higher rate of utilization with its marginal cost
is equal to a higher rate of capital depreciation. The last equation represents
the demand for capital which depends on the marginal real external financing
cost and marginal real cost. The marginal return to capital is next period’s
ex post gross output net of labor costs, normalized by the period t market
value of capital. Thus, we can express the expected marginal return as:
Et {Rb,t+1} =
α Y¯w,t
Kt+1
Pw,t+1 + (Qt+1 − PI,t+1δt)
Qt
(3.18)
1as in Baxter and Farr (2005)
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where Y¯w,t is the average level of output per entrepreneur such that (Yt+1 =
ωt+1Y¯w,t). The marginal cost to the entrepreneur depends on the financial con-
ditions,i.e. the comparison of external and internal finance. As in Bernanke,
Gertler, Gilchrist (1999)(called as BGG afterwards), assuming a costly state
verification problem, the idiosyncratic shock which is private information for
entrepreneur is observed by the lender, the banks, only if they pay an au-
diting cost. That is a fixed proportion µb of the entrepreneur’s gross project
output, thus the auditing cost for the lender will be:
Mt = µbRb,t+1QtKt+1 (3.19)
The financial contract between the entrepreneur and the lender satisfies is
signed to make: (i) the entrepreneur not to misrepresent earnings, (ii) min-
imize the expected auditing costs. Following BGG, if the entrepreneur does
not default, the lender receives a fixed payment independent of ωt; if the en-
trepreneur defaults, the lender gathers the whole earning of the entrepreneur.
The external finance is more costly than internal finance since the lender
charges a premium to cover the bankruptcy costs. The entrepreneur pur-
chases capital to use in the subsequent period at the end of period t. This
purchase is partly financed with the entrepreneur’s real net worth, Ne,t+1, and
by borrowing from banks, Bt+1:
QtKt+1 = Ne,t+1 +Bt+1 (3.20)
The external finance premium varies with the entrepreneur’s net worth, i.e.
if the entrepreneur increases the share of capital, bankruptcy cost decreases
and the external finance premium becomes smaller. The external finance
premium is the additional return to the bank and is an increasing function of
the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio:
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st(.) = s
(
Bt+1
Ne,t+1
)
(3.21)
s′(.) > 0, s(0) = 0, s(∞) =∞
By definition, the entrepreneur’s overall marginal cost of funds is the product
of gross premium for external funds and the real gross opportunity cost of
funds that would arise in the absence of capital market frictions. Thus, the
following equation provides the basis for the financial accelerator mechanism:
Et {Rb,t+1} = st(.)Et {Rt+1} (3.22)
If we define the explicit form of the external finance premium:
Ψe,t =
[
1 +
Bt+1
Ne,t+1
]ψe
(3.23)
Then, eqn. (3.22) becomes:
Et {Rb,t+1} = Ψe,tEt {Rt+1} (3.24)
At the margin, the real return of a unit of capital financed by debt would be
equal to its real cost in capital market without frictions compounded by risk
premium.
The relation that describes the evolution of the entrepreneurial net worth
is another key component of the financial accelerator mechanism. Vt denotes
the value of the entrepreneurial firm capital net of borrowing costs carried
from the previous period, given as:
Vt = Rb,tQt−1Kt − st−1(.)Rt−1Bt (3.25)
where Rb,t is the real return on capital on capital st−1(.)Rt−1 is the cost
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of borrowing. The net worth of entrepreneur is the sum of the value of
entrepreneurial capital net of borrowing costs carried over from the previous
period, and the managerial wage:
Ne,t+1 = φeVt +We,t (3.26)
or explicitly:
Ne,t+1 = φe [Rb,tQt−1Kt −Ψe,t−1Rt−1Bt] +We,t (3.27)
From the net worth equation, it is seen that variations in asset price, i.e. Qt is
the main source of fluctuations in Rb,t, then we can conclude that asset price
movements is crucial in the financial accelerator mechanism. Furthermore,
unexpected deflation reduces the net worth.
The amount of consumption that is consumed by exiting entrepreneurs is
the total amount of equity that is removed from the market, and given as:
Ce,t = (1− φe)Vt (3.28)
Capital Producers
They engage in repair of the depreciated capital and construction of new
capital competitively. Both of these activities take place after the production
of the output at time t. Entrepreneurs require δtKt units of the investment
good to repair the depreciated capital. This is purchased at a cost of PI,tδKt
which are borne by entrepreneurs who own the capital stock. Investment
good, that is used as input in repair and construction activities, is composed
of the foreign and domestic final goods:
It =
[
(γi)
1
ρi (Id,t)
ρi−1
ρi + (1− γi)
1
ρi (If,t)
ρi−1
ρi
] ρi
ρi−1
(3.29)
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The corresponding investment price index will be:
PI,t =
[
(γi)(Pd,t)
1−ρi + (1− γi)(Pf,t)1−ρi
] 1
1−ρi (3.30)
The intra-temporal optimal consumption allocation gives:
Id,t
If,t
=
γi
1− γi
(
Pd,t
Pf,t
)−ρi
(3.31)
The construction of the new capital is constant returns to scale with respect
to Int and Kt where I
n
t is the net investment given as:
Int = It − δKt (3.32)
The economy wide new capital accumulation is:
Kt+1 = Kt + Φ
(
Int
Kt
)
Kt (3.33)
where Φ is a constant returns to scale technology consistent with the adjust-
ment costs for net investment, it is increasing and concave. Furthermore,
there is no substitution between repaired old capital and new capital.
Capital producers choose inputs Int and Kt to maximize expected profits
by the construction of new investment goods. They make their plans to
produce new capital one period in advance, following BGG. The optimality
conditions are:
Et−1
{
QtΦ
′
(
It
Kt
− δt
)
− PI,t
}
= 0 (3.34)
Et−1
{
Qt
[
Φ
Int
Kt
− Φ′
(
Int
Kt
)
Int
Kt
]}
= 0 (3.35)
Equation (3.34) gives the standard “Q-investment” relation.
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Retailers
Monopolistically competitive retailers are owned by the consumers. They
buy wholesale goods in a competitive market, differentiate the product at a
fixed cost κ, and sell those goods to consumers. The fixed cost is assumed to
be proportional to the steady state value of wholesale output such that at the
steady state, the retailers’ profit is equal to zero. The final domestic good is
a CES composite of individual retail goods differentiated by retailer z.
Yd,t =
[∫ 1
0
(Yd,t(z))
v−1
v dz
] v
v−1
− κ (3.36)
The price of the composite domestic final good is:
Pd,t =
 1∫
0
(Pd,t(z))
1−vdz

1
1−v
(3.37)
The isoelastic demand for the differentiated final domestic good is:
Yd,t(z) =
(
Pd,t(z)
Pd,t
)−v
Yd,t (3.38)
The households, capital producers, the government and the rest of the world
buy final goods from the retailers. The isoelastic demand is gathered as a
result of cost minimization.
The retailers set the nominal prices in basis a la Calvo (Calvo, 1983).
(1 − θ) is the probability that the retailers reset their prices to the optimal
independent of time elapsed since the last adjustment. If they do not change
the prices, they keep it fixed at the previous period’s price. For example, if
θ = 0.75 per quarter, on average, the prices are fixed for a year. Let P¯d,t
be the optimal price at time t. In the neighborhood of the steady state, the
domestic price index evolves as:
Pd,t = (Pd,t−1)θ(P¯d,t−1)1−θ (3.39)
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The optimal price is:
P¯d,t = µ
∞∏
i=0
(Pw,t+i)
(1−βθ)(βθ)i (3.40)
where µ = (1 − (1/v)) is the retailer’s gross mark-up over wholesale prices.
The retailers reset the prices based on the expected future path of their
marginal cost.
For domestically produced goods, the gross inflation rate is:
Pd,t
Pd,t−1
=
(
µ
Pw,t
Pd,t
)λ
Et
{
Pd,t+1
Pd,t
}β
(3.41)
where λ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)/θ. This equation is the canonical form of the new
optimization-based Phillips curve. 2
Due to imperfect competition, the price of the foreign goods sold in do-
mestic market has similar pattern. The gross inflation rate for foreign final
goods:
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
=
(
µf
StP
∗
f,t
Pf,t
)λf
Et
{
Pf,t+1
Pf,t
}β
(3.42)
where λf = (1− θf )(1− βθf )/θf The real exchange rate St is defined as:
St =
Pw,f,t
P ∗f,t
(3.43)
The pricing process implies that temporary deviations form the law of one
price due to the delay in the exchange rate pass-through mechanism is cap-
tured by the parameter θf . In the simulation of the model, θ = θf .
Since CPI inflation is a composite of domestic and foreign good price
inflation, it is given by:
Pt
Pt−1
=
(
Pd,t
Pd,t−1
)γ (
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
)1−γ
(3.44)
2see Gali and Gertler, 1999
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3.2.3 Financial Sector
The financial sector consists of banks which are risk-neutral, owned by the
consumers. The banks’ balance sheet consists of the loans to entrepreneurs
as assets, and as liabilities, the deposits from the consumers:
Bt+1 = Nb,t+1 +Dt+1 (3.45)
where Dt+1 denotes the deposits from the households, Bt+1 is the loans to
entrepreneurs ans Nb,t+1 is the net equity of the banking sector. The banks
obey the balance sheet identity of the form ′′loans = deposits + capital′′.
Furthermore, I assume that banks have an optimal target for their capital-
to-asset ratio, i.e. the inverse of the leverage, and deviation from this target
value imposes a quadratic cost to banks. This optimal target value of the
capital-to-asset ratio is determined by the macro-prudential regulator. The
optimal leverage ratio helps to study the implications of the costs of regulatory
capital requirements. In this setup, the bank capital is the key determinant
to specify the credit supply. It generates the mechanism between the real
and the financial sectors of the economy. For example, when the economy is
in the bust period, banks profit and capital might be also hit depending on
the nature of the shock. Due to weak financial position, banks may decrease
lending which will lead to an increase in the capital-to-asset ratio that deepens
the original contraction. It is obvious that real economy shrinkage followed
by reduction in bank profits and capital, and credit restriction.
Following BGG, due to the lending contracts, banks assume that the bor-
rowers pay their debt independent of the idiosyncratic shock, thus their ex-
pected return from each lending contract will be :
Rb,t+1Bt+1 (3.46)
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Then, the expected profit of the banks is defined as:
Et {Πb,t} = Et {Rb,t+1Bt+1 −RtDt+1 −Mt + ∆t −KCt} (3.47)
where Mt is the total debt monitoring costs defined previously, in other terms,
it is the auditing cost assuming a costly state verification problem. Since
the lending contracts are designed to minimize the monitoring costs, it is
negligible; ∆t is the deposit transaction receipts and KCt is the quadratic
costs that banks pay whenever the capital-to-asset ratio moves away from
the target value of ϑt. The quadratic costs is defined as
3:
KCt =
κb
2
(
Nb,t
Bt
− ϑt
)2
Nb,t (3.48)
Banks decision problem consists of choosing loans and deposits to maximize
expected profits. Accordingly, it is defined as:
max
Bt,Dt
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtΛ0,tΠb,t
}
(3.49)
where Λ0,t =
λt
λ0
, and since banks are owned by households, they value future
profits by using the discount factor Λ0,t. Using the balance sheet constraint
for time t and t+ 1, the optimization problem of the banks reduces to:
max
Bt,Dt
Rb,tBt −RtDt − κb
2
(
Nb,t
Bt
− ϑt
)2
Nb,t (3.50)
The first order conditions are derived as:
Rb,t − κb
2
{
2
(
Bt −Dt
Bt
− ϑt
)(
Dt
B2t
(Bt −Dt)
)
+
(
Bt −Dt
Bt
− ϑt
)2}
= 0
(3.51)
3Gerali, Neri, Sessa, Signoretti, 2010
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−Rt−κb
2
{
2
(
Bt −Dt
Bt
− ϑt
)(−1
Bt
)
(Bt −Dt) + (−1)
(
Bt −Dt
Bt
− ϑt
)2}
= 0
(3.52)
where Rt is the monetary policy rate, ϑt is the optimal capital to assets ratio
set by regulator. When the bank wants to extend its loans, thus increases its
leverage and its profits. However, if leverage increases, the capital-to-asset
ratio falls below ϑt and banks pay a cost that they transfer on the interest
paid by borrowers. It is assumed that the banks have access to finance at
policy rate Rt, for that reason, by arbitrage, the deposit rate is equal to policy
rate. Using the last two equations (the FOCs of the banks), the condition
that is the spread between the loan rate and deposit rate is delivered as:
Rb,t = Rt − κb
(
Nb,t
Bt
− ϑt
)(
Nb,t
Bt
)2
(3.53)
where (Rb,t − Rt) represents the marginal benefit from increasing lending,
and the second term in the right hand side represents the marginal cost of
deviating from ϑt. For that reason, banks need to choose the level of loans
as to equalize the marginal benefit and cost of reducing the capital-to-asset
ratio.
At the end of time t, the net equity in the banking sector is:
Nb,t+1 = Rb,tBt −Rt−1Dt −KCt (3.54)
3.2.4 Government
Fiscal Policy
Government has a balanced budget policy that the government expenditures
are financed by lump-sum taxes:
Gt = Tt (3.55)
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Also, the government expenditures follows an AR(1) process as:
Gt = G
ρg
t−1exp
g,t (3.56)
g,t ∼ N(0, σ2g)
3.2.5 External Balances
The wholesale price of foreign goods and the retail price in the domestic
market is differentiated considering the arbitrage in goods market. In the
domestic market, imperfect competition and pricing to market exist. At the
wholesale level, the law of one price holds. The rest of the world demands for
the domestic goods, C∗d,t:
C∗d,t =
[(
P ∗d,t
P ∗t
)−
Y ∗t
]η
(C∗d,t−1)
1−η (3.57)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, Y ∗t is real foreign output and taken as given. C∗d,t−1 repre-
sents inertia in foreign demand for domestic outputs. P ∗t , P
∗
d,t, Y
∗
t represents
the price level in foreign currency, price of domestic good in foreign currency,
and the real output produced in the rest of the world, respectively. In steady
state, trade is in balance and the term of trade is normalized to unity. The
gross foreign real interest rate and the price of the foreign tradable good are
taken as exogenous.
3.2.6 Monetary Policy
The central bank adopts the monetary policy that is modelled via a Taylor
rule implementing an inflation-targeting framework as:
Rt = (Rt−1)ρR(pit)χpi
(
Yt
Y¯
)χy
exp(m,t) (3.58)
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where m,t ∼ N(0, σ2m) is a pure monetary shock. In the simulations of the
model, this rule is called as the simple Taylor rule.
3.2.7 Resource Constraint
For the domestic good sector, the resource constraint is given as:
Yd,t = Cd,t + Ce,t + C
∗
t + It +Gt (3.59)
3.3 Alternative Tools and Policy Experiments
This section discusses the alternative experiments of monetary policy and
macroprudential policy to implement for different cases in which they mix,
and we can see their welfare implications. For this purpose, the scenarios
that are analysed and compared are introduced after the policy alternatives.
Alternative Monetary Policy Tools
Firstly, the central bank follows simple Taylor rule. In that case, the
central bank has the following loss function4:
Lcb = σ2pi + kyσ
2
y (3.60)
An alternative Taylor rule is that the central bank implements the following
augmented Taylor rule where monetary policy contains credit/GDP ratio to
minimize the loss function defined above:
Rt = (Rt−1)ρR(pit)χpi
(
Yt
Y¯
)χy (Bt
Yt
)χb
exp(m,t) (3.61)
4Please note that, in loss functions, σ2 denotes the asymptotic (unconditional) variances
from the steady state values
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In that case, the central bank has the loss function as:
Lcb = σ2pi + kyσ
2
y + kbσ
2
b/y (3.62)
Since, in this model, the credit is the borrowings of the entrepreneurs, Bt
is taken as the credit in the augmented Taylor rule.
Macroprudential Authority
The macroprudential policy authority has its own objective and defined
as5:
ϑt = (1− ρϑ)ϑ¯+ (1− ρϑ)χϑXt + ρϑϑt−1 (3.63)
where as macroprudential tool, capital-to-asset requirement ratio is used, ϑ¯
measures the steady state level of ϑt, Xt is a key macroeconomic variable such
as output growth, loans growth, with the sensitivity parameter of χϑ. The
aim is to see that which one helps in improving the stabilization properties
of the capital requirement rule. The loss function of the macroprudential
authority is defined as:
Lmp = σ2b/y + ky,mpσ
2
y (3.64)
The total loss realized by the two authorities is calculated as:
L = Lcb + Lmp (3.65)
Policy Experiments
Firstly, for the economy in which the macro-prudential regulator does not
exist, the two alternative Taylor rules of the central bank is analysed. The aim
of this experiment is to analyse the main indicators of the economy and the
loss to the society that if the central bank is responsive to financial instability
which is measured by the credit to output growth in the model.
Secondly, I contrast and compare the two economies where the macro-
5it is the log-linearized version
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prudential authority exist and does not exist. For the one that the central
bank is the only regulator, she implements the simple Taylor rule. When the
two authorities exist, the macro-prudential authority has its own objective
function as regulating the banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. This experiment is
beneficial to see if there is a need for macro-prudential regulation or not. In
the case of two regulatory bodies, the loss functions are calculated separately
for each, then summed.
For the third experiment, in one economy, only the central bank exists
and implements the augmented Taylor rule; in the second one, both regulators
exist, the central bank implements simple Taylor rule. This experiment would
be helpful to see which one is better: one regulator considering financial
stability without macro-prudential tool or two regulators that each considers
different objectives of price stability and financial stability.
The fourth one is similar to the previous one, however, now the central
bank implements the augmented Taylor rule when there are two regulatory
bodies. This experiment would be helpful to see if there is a further coop-
erative action for the financial instability regulation, that the two regulatory
bodies are integrated or coordinated.
For the fifth experiment the two cases are compared: two regulatory bodies
exist, the central bank implements simple Taylor rule and separate macro-
prudential authority exists; the other one is designed as two regulatory bodies
exist, but the central bank implements the augmented Taylor rule. This
experiment shows more explicitly that whether the two regulatory bodies
should be separated or integrated. When the two regulatory bodies exist
and considers the financial stability, observation of the two are separated or
integrated is not straight forward, but as loss function, the loss function is
the sum of the two authorities’ loss function.
For the sixth experiment, Taylor rule without output gap is considered
and analysed for different cases. Since the output volatility is also considered
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as a financial instability indicator, this gives idea about the responsibility of
the central bank in terms of financial stability. It is a compare and contrast
analysis of Taylor rule for given macro-prudential regulation. In that scenario,
there exist a sequencing in the decision making process of the two regulatory
bodies. The reason can be supported as macroprudential decisions are taken
with lower frequency. Furthermore, the symmetric analysis is conducted for
macro-prudential policy. For given simple Taylor rule, macro-prudential pol-
icy tool is checked without output gap and loan to output growth. The
justification of that scenario can be that since the macroprudential policy
maker is less active, first monetary policy authority sets monetary policy rule
and then macroprudential authority sets the macroprudential tool as taking
the monetary policy given.
As another case, the parameters ρϑ and χϑ of macro-prudential tool is
checked for different values for the sensitivity analysis.
Lastly, the monetary policy tool and macroprudential tool is changed as
the two regulatory bodies are taking each other’s tool into consideration.
Then the tools is changed as6:
Rt = ρR(Rt−1) + χpi(pit) + χy
(
Yt − Y¯
)
+ χϑϑt + m,t (3.66)
ϑt = (1− ρϑ)ϑ¯+ (1− ρϑ)χϑXt + ρϑϑt−1 + χϑ,rRt (3.67)
I call this case as integrated two regulatory bodies, however, in this context of
model, it is not obvious to see the two are separated or integrated since they
both take each other’s tool into consideration when they are also separate.
6in log-linearized terms
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3.4 Results
Results of the Policy Experiments
Before proceeding into analysis through different experiments via different
cases, it would be beneficial to recall the channels that monetary policy and
macro-prudential policy affect the economy. Monetary policy affect, firstly,
the cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs and, secondly, the return on house-
holds deposits. Through the first channel, it affects the investment decision
of entrepreneurs; and through the second channel, it influences consumption
and saving decision of households that do not borrow from banks and hold de-
posits, respectively. Macro-prudential policy affects the costs of banks capital
position, and, for that reason, it affects the cost for entrepreneurs borrowing
from banks. Macro-prudential policy has no direct influence on the deposit
rate.
To see the effect of the macro-prudential policy implemented to the sys-
tem, I will compare and contrast different cases: (1) simple Taylor rule versus
augmented Taylor rule, (2) simple Taylor rule versus simple Taylor rule and
independent time varying macro-prudential policy, (3) augmented Taylor rule
versus simple Taylor rule and independent time varying macro-prudential pol-
icy, (4) augmented Taylor rule versus augmented Taylor rule and independent
time varying macro-prudential policy, (5) simple Taylor rule and independent
time varying macro-prudential policy versus augmented Taylor rule and inde-
pendent time varying macro-prudential policy, (6) simple Taylor rule without
considering output gap and independent time varying macro-prudential pol-
icy versus simple Taylor rule and independent time varying macro-prudential
policy, (7) sensitivity analysis for the time varying macro-prudential tool by
changing the variable parameters, (8) integrated two regulatory tools. Anal-
ysis is done through the loss calculated by unconditional variances and the
impulse response function (IRF) graphs of key variables.
For the first experiment, there is only one regulator, the central bank,
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implementing the Taylor rule. It compares the simple Taylor rule and the
augmented Taylor rule. This experiment is conducted to see if there is a
remarkable change when the central bank takes the credit growth into con-
sideration or not. When a monetary shock hits to the economy, the effect on
output dies faster under simple Taylor rule. It is the case for all other key
variables such as investment, inflation, real interest rate. It also holds for the
borrowings of entrepreneurs. However, when we compare the unconditional
variances, the variance of output and inflation increases. It may be due to
the fact that there is a conflict arises between the objectives of the central
bank. The variance of the borrowings decreases since it takes the credit (bor-
rowings of entrepreneurs in the model) into account. Under technology shock
and a shock to the government expenditure, the results are the same, the
effect of the shock on the variables dies faster in the simple Taylor rule, but
the borrowings respond lasts more. Furthermore, the net worth (capital) of
the banks, and the entrepreneurs, and the external finance premium respond
more smoothly under technology shock. Moreover, for the Taylor rule specifi-
cation, I checked that whether the Taylor rule should contain the lag of policy
rate or not, the one that contains the lag of the policy rate gave smoother
IRFs. For that reason, it is chosen in the analyses.
In the second experiment, there are two regulatory bodies in the economy,
the central bank conducting simple Taylor rule and the macro-prudential
policy maker issues time-varying capital requirement ratio. Surprisingly, there
is no significant difference between the two, however, it does not mean there is
no need for macro-prudential regulatory body. It may imply that independent
two regulatory bodies do not provide any improvement in the welfare. For
that reason, further analysis is needed.
In the third experiment, in one case, the augmented Taylor rule is imple-
mented by one regulator considering both price stability and financial sta-
bility; for the other case in which two regulatory bodies exist, the simple
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Taylor rule is implemented by the central bank and the time varying macro-
prudential policy by the macro-prudential regulator. When we compare the
two cases, output is more volatile and the effect of monetary shock on output
dies more slowly in the case of one regulator. All other key variables respond
to monetary shock in the same manner except the borrowings. In response to
a monetary shock, borrowings respond more volatile in the case of two sepa-
rate regulators, and turns to initial value more slowly. Under the technology
shock and government expenditure shock, the results from the IRFs are the
same except that the deposits are a bit more responsive, and although the
credit responds more, it turns back to its initial value faster in the case of
two regulatory bodies. This experiment gives idea about the fact that the
two regulatory bodies should be separated and independent of each other if
we consider the output gap as instability indicator. However, the borrowings
is less volatile in the case of one regulator, but since the difference of respon-
siveness and the volatility do not differ significantly, from this experiment we
can conclude that the two regulatory bodies should be separate.
As a fourth experiment, in one case, there exist one regulator implement-
ing the augmented Taylor rule, and in the other case, there are two regulatory
bodies implementing the augmented Taylor rule and a time-varying macro-
prudential policy where dependence exist between the regulatory bodies since
both of them takes credit into account. In that experiment, when the IRFs
of the key variables are compared, there is not an explicit difference between
the two cases; however, the difference arises in the variances. The variance of
output, inflation and credit increase, and in percentage, the credit increases
the most in the case that the two authorities exist and cares financial stability.
This experiment may show that there might emerge coordination problems
between the two regulatory bodies.
For the fifth experiment, under both cases, the two regulatory bodies ex-
ist. The only difference is in the structure of the Taylor rule, in one case, the
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central bank implements simple Taylor rule and, in the other, the augmented
Taylor rule. If a monetary shock hits the economy, except the credit, all key
variables are more responsive and have higher volatilities, output responds
to technology shock more cyclically, however, the credit seems to be more
controllable. If we compute the loss to overall economy, we can see that al-
though the variance of output, inflation and monetary policy rate increased,
the decrease in the variance of the credit compensates, and the overall loss
to the economy decreases significantly in the case that the central bank im-
plements augmented Taylor rule. At this point, the important thing is the
weights of variables in the loss function. This experiment gives idea about the
independence of macro-prudential policy. Since the loss decreases when the
central bank do not take the credit to output ratio into consideration, it may
imply that the macro-prudential policy maker should be independent from
the central bank; or the result might be implying the coordination problems
between the two bodies, so a solution for coordination problem should be
searched. Also, if the central bank implements the augmented Taylor rule, it
is seen that the response and volatility of inflation increases which suggests
that conflict of interests for the central bank arises.
For the sixth experiment, given macro-prudential policy, another version
of Taylor rule is checked; it is simplified version of simple Taylor rule that
does not considers output growth, which is also seen as financial stability
indicator. Moreover, as a similar experiment, for given monetary policy dif-
ferent structures of macro-prudential policy is analysed, i.e. extracting the
output growth and credit to output ratio, the rule is simulated. For the first
subcase, given macro-prudential policy, if the output growth is extracted from
monetary policy, by the analysis of IRFs, it is seen that under a monetary
policy rate shock, the impulse of key variables such as output, investment,
consumption increases whereas the IRFs of the two cases have similar pat-
terns apart from the responsiveness. The capital and the inflation rate is less
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volatile and respond to shock more smoothly. Less volatile inflation rate is
an expected result since without output gap, the only objective of the cen-
tral bank becomes the price stability. When there is technology shock, the
similar results are gathered, but, monetary policy rate, real interest rate and
inflation has smoother IRFs and the effect of the shocks die faster than the
case where Taylor rule with output growth is implemented.
As the second subcase, for given monetary policy, the changes in the
macro-prudential policy are analyzed. When the output growth and credit
growth is removed from the macro-prudential policy rule, there is not a sig-
nificant difference between the impulses, the only change is the impulse of
macro-prudential tool as expected. The unconditional variances of key vari-
ables are almost the same as the case where both of them are included to the
macro-prudential policy tool.
Another experiment is that the two regulatory tools are affecting each
other. If we call it as integrated case, the IRFs claims that under monetary
shock, the loans volatility increases, but under a technology shock, the re-
spond of the monetary policy tool rate decreases and smoother inflation is
gathered.
The last experiment is the sensitivity analysis of the macro-prudential
tool. The analysis is done by changing the parameters of output growth, loan
growth and the parameter that enters into the cost of banks (κb). When the
parameter of output growth (χϑ) is increased so much, the volatility of output
decreases parallel to the increase in the sensitivity parameter as expected.
However, the volatility of the macro-prudential tool increases in the same
manner. The change in the lag of the macro-prudential tool (ρmp) creates a
change in the variance of macro-prudential tool, if it decreases, the variance
of it increases. However, there is no considerable change in the unconditional
variances and the impulses of the key variables.
Under sensitivity analysis, the change of the κb creates more significant
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changes than any other parameter change. Since it is the parameter of the
channel that macro-prudential policy tool affects directly the economy. When
the value of the kappa increases, the loss of the economy increases and almost
all the key variables are more impulsive including output; however, if the value
of the kappa decreases the loss to the society decreases.
With different experiments, in total, mainly the following cases is checked:
(i) simple Taylor rule, (ii) augmented Taylor rule, (iii) simple Taylor rule
and time-varying macroprudential tool, (iv) augmented Taylor rule and time-
varying macroprudential tool, (v) integrated tools. To sum up, with the help
of different experiment analyses and the IRFs, it is seen that in the content
of a DSGE model that I used, the separation and integration of the two
authorities is cannot be explicitly identified since the legal basis of such an
arrangement cannot be made in such a DSGE setup for my model. However,
we can make some comments related to the two tools of financial stability
and price stability. In case of no separate macroprudential tool, the central
bank should implement augmented Taylor rule, meaning she should take the
financial stability responsibility into consideration. When the two tools are
used, it is seen that, the central bank should implement the augmented Taylor
rule and there should be a separate macroprudential regulation tool.
Mainly, if we make the concluding analyses through loss function calcula-
tions, different values of the parameters of output growth and loan to output
ratio (ky, ky,mp) are checked. The aim is to minimize the sum of losses since
I assume that the financial stability and price stability has same weights for
the total loss. The minimum loss is gathered when there is one regulator,
the central bank, implementing augmented Taylor rule. The results are the
same when the weight of the output growth is increased in the loss function of
central bank for given parameters of the loss function of the macroprudential
authority. Also, for given parameters of the central bank loss function, if we
change the weight of output growth in the loss function of the macropruden-
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tial authority, the result remains the same. The second best is the one that
there exist two regulatory authorities and the central bank implements aug-
mented Taylor rule. Furthermore, it is seen that for higher weight of output
growth in central bank loss function, the difference between one regulator
implementing Taylor rule and two regulators implementing separate tools de-
creases, and the two become closer. Moreover, the integrated tools case is a
second best only if the central bank has output in its loss function but the
macroprudential regulator has only loan to output growth.
For further analysis of future work, when the two authorities considers
financial stability, the following loss function should be simulated:
L = αLcb + (1− α)Lmp (3.68)
where α can affect the overall welfare and gives an intuition about the relative
importance of price stability with respect to financial stability.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
There is an increasing debate about the structure of financial stability and
price stability responsibilities. This paper examines the role of the central
bank implementing different Taylor rules and the role of a macroprudential
authority implementing the time-varying capital requirement. Different sce-
narios for different policy rules and mix of two regulatory bodies are compared
and contrasted.
The analyses of different cases is done through the impulse response func-
tions of main indicators and the loss function of the two authorities. There
are three types of shocks in the model: monetary shock, technology shock
and government expenditure shock. I made the comparison for all type of
shocks. However, my main interest is the real shocks to see the mechanism
that by a real shock, the macroprudential tool is affected, then in turn, it
affects the balance sheet of the banks, but, my aim is to see an effect on the
real indicators of the macroeconomy to capture the channel between financial
sector and real sector. The results was as I expected. In the case of a posi-
tive technology shock, an upturn of the economy, the banks increase loans to
entrepreneurs, and the bank capital also increases more than loans which is
the result that we want since the macroprudential tool aims capitalization of
banks in an upturn of the economy. Furthermore, the return to initial values
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are faster in the case of a macroprudential tool.
When I compare one regulator implementing simple Taylor rule and two
regulators implementing separate tools, there is not an explicit difference
monitored with the help of impulse response functions. It might be the re-
sult of the sensitivity parameter that the macroprudential tool affects the
economy. However, with further analysis, according to the impulse response
function graphs, it is obvious that the best results are gathered when the
central bank takes the loan to output growth into consideration, in other
terms it implies that the central bank should take the financial stability into
consideration.
When we compare the cases that one regulator implementing augmented
Taylor rule and two regulatory bodies, the results states that one regulator
case has more stable outcomes for the main indicators of the economy. The
result implies conflict of interest arises in the case of two stability tools.
However, there is not an explicit difference when I compare the loss functions.
The price stability and financial stability may seem running a horse race
among each other, however, the two reinforces each other for the stability
of the economy as a whole. The results implies the requirement of financial
stability considerations. In case of a separate time-varying macroprudential
tool, the central bank also takes financial stability into consideration.
Further and future work involves changing the weight of each regulatory
body in the total loss function. Moreover, after extending the model that fits
more to the real economy, the model will be calibrated for Turkey. Another
future work involves the empirical study to see whether the macroprudential
policy creates such an effect emphasized in theory as in the literature.
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APPENDICES
4.1 Appendix A-Table of Parameters
Table 4.1: Parameters
Symbol Value Description
β 0.99 discount factor of consumers
h 0.5 habit persistence parameter
ρ 1.1 consumption intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
χ 0.5 inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity
γ 0.5 share of domestic goods in composite consumption good
φe 0.9728 entrepreneur’s average survival rate
Ω 0.01 share of entrepreneurial labor
α 0.5 share of capital in production function
ρa 0.9 AR(1) coefficient for technology process
δ 0.0125 parameter in the functional form of the capital depreciation rate
δ(u) 0.025 steady state depreciation rate of capital
b 0.025 parameter in the functional form of the capital depreciation rate
ξ 1 elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to utilization rate
u 1.0 steady-state capital utilization rate
µ 1.2 steady-state mark-up
η 0.25 (1− η) is weight of inertia in export demand
 1 elasticity of export demand
γi 0.5 share of domestic goods in investment
ρi 0.25 intra-temporal elasticity of substitution of investment
θ 0.75 probability of fixing prices in domestic final goods market
θf 0.75 probability of fixing prices in foreign final goods market
ρg 0.95 AR(1) coefficient for government expenditure process
ρR 0.77 interest rate smoothing factor
χpi 2 Taylor rule coefficient on inflation
χy 0.75 Taylor rule coefficient on output
χb 0.75 Taylor rule coefficient on credit to output ratio
ρϑ 0.9990 macroprudential tool smoothing factor
χϑ,y 1.9779 sensitivity parameter of output growth in macroprudential tool
χϑ,b 2.05 sensitivity parameter of credit growth in macroprudential tool
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4.2 Appendix B-Table of Unconditional Vari-
ances
Unconditional variances for output, inflation and loan growth under
different policy experiments7
Table 4.2: Unconditional variances
Symbol Value Description
sTR aTR sTRmp aTRmp integrated
outputgrowth 0.343297 0.40657 0.346894 0.416674 0.470406
inflation 0.081311 0.120195 0.081608 0.12219 0.122964
loangrowth 0.825237 0.274008 0.853658 0.288594 0.691621
7sTR represents simple Taylor rule, aTR represents augmented Taylor rule, sTRmp
represents simple Taylor rule and macroprudential tool, aTRmp represents augmented
Taylor rule and macroprudential tool
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4.3 Appendix C-Impulse Response Function
Graphs
Two regulators: the central bank implementing the simple Taylor
rule, and separate time-varying macroprudential tool
Orthagonolized monetary shock
Orthagonolized monetary shock
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Orthagonolized technology shock
Orthagonolized technology shock
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Two regulators: the central bank implementing the augmented Tay-
lor rule and separate time-varying macroprudential tool
Orthagonolized monetary shock
Orthagonolized monetary shock
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Orthagonolized technology shock
Orthagonolized technology shock
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